109 condition for triaJ.2 The sufficient co11dition is very simple. I wjll explain it. and then examine a recent atte1npt to specify necessary and sufficient conditions.
Opti.inisn1 theory of trials
Negotiations to avoid a triaJ can be described as a bargaining ga1ne in which settlen1ent
is the cooperative solution and triaJ is the no11cooperative solution. l11e threat values of the parties are defined by their subjective predictions about the outcome of a trial. Suppose that both parties are optimistic about t he triaJ in the sense that the defendant believes that the court award wiU be negligible, whereas the plaintiff believes that the award will be large. Such optimism Q.O make the su,n of the subj ective values of trial to the defendant and plaintiff exceed the stakes in the dispute. If it is imp0ssible to divide the stakes so t hat both parties get at leas( their subjective value of trial, then trial is inevitable. 111 technical language, a sufficient co11dit ion for trial is that the core of the gan1e is e1npty.
V.'hat causes expectaOons to be biased towards optimisn1 rather than unbiased?
The typical answer to this question is provided by the conventional theory of adjudication. 3
The conventional theory holds that t rial courts decide routine cases by ascertaining the facts and contbining them with the. law. The combination of facts a11d laws establishc$ the right or one party to win the case. Resolving a dispute in t his way is said to be a decision on the merits of the case. In n1any disputes, both sides believe they would win a trial decided 011 the merits. Thus, the psychologjcaJ origin o f the· bias toward optin1ism is believing that one's own actions are free fro,n fault, or, in a word, self-righteousness causes optimism.
How would a private judge behave in order to tnaxim.ize demand for his services from Oplimislic disputants? 1'he obvious answer is that the judge would try to acquire i reputation for deciding cases on the merits. In order to do so the judge would have to pick l, S. L 10 a specialty and acquire skill at inlerpreting that particular body of Jaw. 4 He would have to become so good at writing opinio11s that lawyers agree that he decides cases on the merits, even when the lawyer's client loses.
Optimism, which probably explains a lot of trials, is a bias in judgment. Bias is psychological, bul economics seeks to ground explanation in rationality, which implies unbiased judgment. Furthermore, optimism theory explains the demand for private judges by a shared opinion about them, but in reality there is diverSity of Opirtion concerning the ranking or judges. 111 the next sections, a theory of trials is developed which assumes rational expectations, rather than biased expectations, and an account of demand for judges is developed which assumes disagreement, rather than unanimity, about the ranking of judges.
The problen1 of strategy
The optimism theory of trials relies upon the fact that an empty core is a sufficient con· dition for a noncooperativc solution. I have argued elsewhereS that a necessary and suf· ficient condition for trials can be developed by drawing upon the concept of a BayesianNash equilibrium.6 1 will develop a brief explanation or this conception or trials in order to show the sttategy which private judges would pursue to maximize their income.
In order to develop the framework:, we must characterize the features of bargaining games which distinguish them from other types of games. A zero-sum game is a game in whjch totaJ winnings minus total losses equals zero.7 It is a game of pure redistrihuti-On because nothing is created or destroyed. Poker is an example. By contrast, a coordination game is a game in which the players have the same goal.8 For exantple, ir a phone conversation is cut off, then the callers face a coordination problem. The connection cannot be restored unless someone dial a, but the call will not go through if both dial at once. The players win or lose as a team, and winning is productive .
• so coordination gan1es are games of pure production.
A bargaining gan1e in\•olves distribution and production.9 TypicaHy, there is something to be divided caJled the stakes. For example, one person may have a car to sell and anoLhcr may have 1no11ey to spend. The stakes are the money and the car. (f the players can agree on how to divide the stakes, for instance, jf they can agree on a price for the car, then both or them will benefit. The surplus is the joint benefit fro,n cooperation, such as the gain from trading the car for money. If the players cannot agree on how to divide the stakes, then the surplus will be lost. In brief, bargajning games are games in which production is contingent on agreernent about distribution.
The fundamental obstacle to cooperation is t he absenc· e or an authoritative rule for dividing the stakes. It is up to the players to find a dl\'islon of the stakes acceptable to both of them. Strategy coosists in trying to maneuver an opponent into accepting an unfavorable distribution. The objective of a skillful bargainer is to convince others th.at he intends to act in such a way that it is in their best interest to do what is in his best interest. lnefllcient outco1nes occur when the playerS miscalculate; fo r instance, when I think that your sincere threat is a bluff.
Legal disput~ achieve a close fi t to this abstract characteriz.ation of bargaining games. The players are usually well-defined, consisting of a plaintiff and de(endant. The stakes arc-also well-defined, such as the cost of an accident, the damage from nonper· formance on a contract, the property accumulated in a marriage, the estate of the deceased, or the assets of a bankrupt company. In pre-trial negotiations, everyone has an interest in avoiding a triaJ. The surplus from cooperation is usually obvious; for example. legal fees, cost of delaying resolution of the dispute, or waste from an inefficient judicial outco1ne.
Tite plaintiff and defendant have an incentive to avoid trial, but they have a disagreement over how to divide the stakes. There is a problen1 of efficiency and also one of distribution. Let Q( I • b) be the probability that the defendant demands no more than I • b. Conse· quently, the probability of settlement is Q and the probability of trial is 1 · Q. Let the plaintiff's payoff from trial be T. The problem faced by a plaintiff who nlaximizes expected income can l:>e writ ten
The firs t order condition is
O>Q-Q' · (b·Tl.
where the first tenn is the gain from settling for an additional dollar times the probability of settlement, and the second term is the difference in payoff between settlement and trial multiplied by the marginal probability.
In this example. each player makes one final offer. Real bargaining is a sequence of offers and counteroffers, not a single pair of offers. There is a device which can be used lo reduce the complex problem to a form which is mathematjc,ally idehticaJ with the simple problem. A rational bargainer plans to make offers in each round of negotiations. He will probably revise the plan according to the way bargaining goes in the early rounds. We can imagine that a rational bargainer anticipates the possible n1oves of opponents and constructs a complete contingency plan before the first round of negotiations. A contingency plan for making demands can bC called a bargaining strdtegy. One bargaining strategy is "harder" than another by definition if a player following the rirst strategy de1 nands at least as ,nuch as he would i f he were following the second strategy in every round of negotiations, re,, gardless of che contingency .l O Graphically, one strategy is harder than another if the offers in the first strategy lie entirely below the offers in the second strategy, as in Figure I .
Choosing the strategy of optima) hardness is almost identical 1nathematicaJ.ly with choosing the optimal final demand. If a player adopts a hard strategy, then he receives a larger share of the stake.,; in the eve,lt of settlen1ent. But a harder strategy is less likely to result in settlement. If the pair of strategies chosen by the playel'S is too hard, then the dispute will be resolved by trial. Thus, a player finds his optimal strategy by trading off a larger share of the stakes against a higher probability of trial. There is no substantial change in the 1nathe1naticaJ formulation of the choice problem, which we discussed above, except that t he choice variable bis interpreced as an index of the hardness of the strategy.
Given the subjective expectations Q and the threat value T, plus other characteristics of the utility functions, it is possible to compute the optimal bargaining strategy of the plaintiff and defendant. The con1bination of the two strategies wiU determine the outcome.
If both parties are optiJnistic and assign a high value to trial r. then negotiations will fail.
r11is is the sufficient condition fol' trials discussed in the preceding section. Even if both parties are not overly optimistic about the value of trials T, they may push too hard for bargaining concessions and cause the process to miscarry. For example, suppose that the defendant breaches a contract with the plaintiff, and th.ere is a dispute over the amount of damages. E.ach perSon wiU adopt a bargaining strategy which can be characterized on a scale of hardness. The objective distribution is the actual frequency with which disputants with the same observable-traits adopt strategies 115 ranging over the scale or hardness. If the subjective expectations of the disputants correM spond to the objective freq_uency, then their expectations are rationaJ, Expectations are said 10 be in equilibrium when they are rational. If expectations are biased, rather than rational, the lawyers wiU be surprised by the frequency with which bargaining in such cases breaks down. Th.is surprise will cause lawyers to communicate revised expe.ctations to their clients. Revisions of expectations wiU cease when bias is eliminated and bargaining breaks down with the anticipated frequency.
It should now be apparent why th.is equilibrium concept can be called a BayesianNash equilibriurn. llle equilibrium is Bayesian in the sense that everyone chooses the bargaining strategy which max.imi.zes his expected utility, The equilibrium is Nash in the sense that everyone knows the distribution of strategies pursued by others, although not the exact identity of each potential opponent.
A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium differs in several different respects from other concepts of bargaining equilibriun1. The conventional Nash equilibrium is defined as a condition jn which the players 1naximi2e utility simultaneously, as opposed to n1ax.io1i2ing expected uti.lity. In other words, the conventional Nash equilibrium eliminates uncertainty. Eliminating uncertainty is unacceptable for studying trials. since the failure to settle is ultimately a con.sequence of uncertainty. titost of the ex ace bargaining solutions, such as the NashZeuthen solution, eliminate bargain.ing breakdowns by assun1ption. If group rationality is assumed, so that the bargaining surplus is never lost, then the phenomeoon being studied.-trials-is assumed away.
Mathematical fonnulation
The description of the bargaining game can be made more precise with the help of some notation, but the nonmathe1natical reader may wish to skip this section. In each round, the players observe their opponent's offer or demand. ~t ~; denote the vector of offers and counteroffers prior to round /:
A rational bargainer will fonnu late a sequence of offers or demands which is continge nt upon his opponent's moves. Let x;; = x ;;<!;) denote a plan by player j in which his o ffer or demand in period i is a function or~;· A plan is a map from a unit polygon into lhe unit interval. A strategy is a sequence of contingent plans o,'er T rounds of bargaining:
Choosing the optimal strategy is an intractable dynamic programming problem unless the dimensionality of choice is reduced. In re· al bargaining situations, the strategy of a player is often characterized as "hard" or "soft." The hardness of a strategy can be de ..
fined as follows:
Assume that each player J restricts his choice of strategy to a set S; whose clcmenlS can be ranked by hardness. Also, it is convenient to assu,ne that Si contains the pair of strategies which is the most ex.tre1ne with respect to hardness, namely (0, O •... , 0) and (1, 1, ...
• 1).
This assumption bounds the set and guarantees that at least one strategy in SI results in settlement rcgardJess of the opponent's strategy. expectations about the probability distribution over opponent's strategies are con finned by actual behavior .11
The equilibrium condition that subjeccive expectations equal objective frequencies is illustrated for the plai1ltiff in Figure 3 . The fu11ction bd = bd(ud, w) on Che "floor" of the figure relates the defendant's unobservable trait ud to the hardness of his bargaining strategy bd. In equilibriurn, the plaintiff's subjective probability distribution qP over the hardncis of defendant's bargaining scrdtegy, as shown on the "right wall" of the figure, corresPQnds to the objective distribution s 1 over lh.c defendant's unobservable trait, as shown 011 the "left wall" of the figure.
Four-person example
The concept of a Bayesian-Nash equilibriun1 in pretrial bargaining can be illustrated by a sinlple four.person cxan1pJe. Suppose that there is a recurring accident which create.~ dis· putes between victims and injurers over how much should be paid in conlpensation. The disputes can be resolved cooperaeively by an out-of.court settlement or noncooperatively by a costly trial. For Simplicity. normalize the payoffs in each dispute so that the problem is to agree upon the division of one unit, where the parties receive nothing i(tbey disagree.
Assume that the parties to the disputes can be distinguished into two groups of equal size, depending upon whether they are risk oeutrnl or extrerneJy averSe to risk. The risk-neutral players maximize their expected Jlloney payoff without discounting for risk.
The extremely risk·averse players maximize the minintum payoff which they can secure with certainty. Each player faces an equal probability of drawing a risk-neutral opponent or a 1naximin opponent.
In each dispute, the plaintiff and defendant simultaneously propose . It is easy to see that the risk·averse players arc maxirniiing their minin1um payoff.
The risk-averse plaintiff knows that half of his opponents will offer .9 and half will <>(fer .2. By demanding .2, the maxi,nin plaintiff receives the l;u:gcsl payoff which always results in a settlement. Sintilarly, the risk-averse defendant who offers .9 n1inin1i1,~ the payoff to the plaintiff which always re.suits in settlement, given the fact that half of the plaintjffs demand .2 a nd halfde,nand .9. The expected payoff rrom de1nanding .9 is higher than from de,nanding .2, and so the risk· 11eutral plaintiff demands .9.
By the same reasoning it is possible to show that lhe risk-neutral defendant chooses between offering .2, with expected payoff 1/2(.8) % .4, or offering .9, with expected payoff 122 1/2(.1) + 1/2(. 1 + .7/2) = .275. Thus, the risk-neutral defendant offers .2. The demonstration that (.9, .2, .9, .2) is a Ba}•esian-Nash equilibriu,n is complete.
It is straightfol'ward to solve for all of the Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the fou r- The equilibrium behavior of the parties satisfies equations (I) and (2) and also the behavior rules for the risk-neutral players. 1t is easy to see that the equilibria involve identi· cal dc-mands and offers by everyone, Xnp = x,np = Xmd = x,,d• or else the weak inequalities which part it ion the behavioral rules ate satisfied. Contbining equations ( I) and (2) with the partitioniog inequalities yields the equilibrium relations All or the equilibria arc graphed in Figure 4 . judge. frnagirle that t he disputants ha,•e negotiated with each other and concluded that se ttlement is impossible. Differences between the,n a re unresolved, but che gap is not so grc.at as to preclude agreement over a judge. Now t hey e nter a se.cond stage of limited negotiatioo, in "' 'hich they try to agree upon the choice of a private judge. If they can agree, they can obtain the advantages o f an im1nediate trial a od avoid a randorn assignn1ent of a j udge to their C3SC, If they cannol agree, chen the dispute will have to be solved by a public trial.
Bargaining over choice of a judge is no differe nt in principle from bargaini ng to achieve a settlement. Self-interest dicta tes that disputants rank j udges according to the expected payoff of each judge's decision. T he expectation will depend upon the reputation of the judge. Atte,n pting to agree to choose a j udge with a particular repu tation is no different fo rmally from attempting to agree upon h O\Y to split the surplus front a settlement.
Suppose that a j udge tends to make decisions which are inefficient in the sense that t he joint payoffs to t he disputants are not n1aximized . Possibl)', however, another judge would ,n!' lke a decision whicll is preferred by both disputants. ,\ny judge who is pairwise inefficien t c1.1n be dominated by an efficient judge. We may assun1e that both disputants rank each inefficient judge lower than an alternative judge who is efficient; thus, bargaining is confined to haggling over judges on the Pareto fro ntier.
Once haggling is constrained to points on the Pareto frontier, the re,naining dispute concerns d istribution. If t he parties agree about t he likely o utcome of trial before each of the efficient j udges, then t heir rankin~ of these judges will be diametrically opposed.
ln other words, the judge who is rankod highest within the set of efficient judges by the plaintiff will be ranked lowest withio t hat set by t he defendaTlt .
This bargaining problen1 conforms to the s tandard mathe,natical form. To see this fact , as.o;i,gn the efficient judges a rank in t he interval ( 0, 11, where a higher rank indicates that the j udge is preferred by the plaintiff. Let bl' be the rank o f the judge whom the plaintiff propOSC$ in bargaining, ~nd let bd be t he rank of the j udge who,n the defendant proposes. Agreement will be reached O\fer choice of a private j udge if !JP < bd; otherwise, there will l>e a public t rial. The disputants find their optimal bargaining strategies by the san1e process ,vh..ich was described earlier in the paper. Let Q (J • b ) be the probability that lhe defendant will accept the j udge identified by the rank b . T here is a monotonic relation· ship between Lh.c ordering of judges and the utility of the disputants, so let u(b) be the ulility to the plaintiff associated with judge b. Let T represent utility to the plairHif( from a public trial. lf bargaining is restricted to a single round, then the plaintiff will con1putc
her optimal demand by choosing If> to 1naximize
Income max.imi:1..ation by private judges Now I can describe \vhat a private judge ,nust do in order to maximize his income. First.
he must try to ntake deci,;;ions which are pairwise ef(icjent for pltiintiff and defendant. This is especially intportant in technical cases where the judge C-an sometimes discover more produclive solutions than the parties could envisioo in advance of the trial.
Second, the judge must divide the stakes so that disputants c-hoose hinL In equi· Hbrium, judges are assumed to know the probability that disputants will agree to choose a judge with a particular reputation, e .g. 1 a reputation for being, say, generous to accident victims or being hard on parties who breach contn1.cts. Competitive equilibrium is reached iunon.g private judges when they adjust their reputations until each one earns the sanle income. Consequently I there mu..:;t be a C.Orre$pondence between the distribution of de .. mands by disputants and the distribution of judges by reputations. For exatnple, if most disputants agree to choose a private judge who eajoys a reputation fo r making moderate awards to a certain class of plaintiffs, but a few disputants agree to choose a judge who is generous to plaintiffs, then in competitive equilibrium most judges will make 1nodcrate
awards and a few judges will make gencrou.s awards in that class of dispute-s.
Four'"l)erson example again
In order to illustrate the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium concept, a four.person exa1nple is presented in which half of the players arc risk neuLral and h:1lf are exlremely risk averse.
There are n1ultiplc equilibria in this example, one o f which is (xnp· xn,p· x,nd• x,,d) = (.9, .2, .9, .2). Bargah1ing breaks down when the risk-neutral plaintiff is paired against the risk~neutral defendant, which occurs 25% of the lin1e and a solution is achieved the re· maining 75% of the time. The solution assigns plaintiffs .2 • . S. and .9 with equal frequency.
If th.is example of equilibrium is interpreted as bargaining over choice of a private judge, then there will be a public trial in 25% of disputes ~nd a private judge will be chosen in the remaining 75% of cases. Furthennore, den1and for judges will be divided equally between those with a reputation of awarding the plaintiff 20% or the surplus, 50% of the surplus, or 90% of the surplus. We may call these judges harsh, moderate. and generous towards plah'ltiffs, respectively. If judges with the same reputation have an equal chance of being chosen, the supply of judges will be in equilibrium when there is an equal number of harsh, moderate, and generous judges.
Mathematical formulation
To represent these facts mathernatically, let qP(bd) be che plaintifrs subjective probability that the defendant will offer bd, and let qd(bP) be the defendant's subjective probability that the plaintiff will demand bl'. Equilibrium expectations correspond to objective pro--babilities, and a settlement occurs if t,I' < bd. so the equilibrium probability of a settlen1ent is For analytical simplicity. assume that the plaintif(s demand is the basis of the agreement whenever tP < bd. 12 Thus, the probability that a particular value bis the bargained so- 
prob (bis solution) = qd(b)( I • Ql'(b)).
It is convenient to assume a continuum of judges, each of whom chooses a reputation b in the intervaJ (0, I ) . The density function n(b) describes the number or judges with repulation b. If judges with the same reputation have an equal probability of being chosen by disputants., then Lhe probability of a b·judge being chosen can be wdttcn
If each judge chooses his reputation b to maxiinize his probability of being chosen, then in equilibrium the probability of a b·j udge being chosen is the san,e for all values of b :
If the uniu of n(b) 3rc chosen appropriateJy,13 this equation i1nplies that the equilibrium distribution of judges equals the equilibrium distributio11 of bargaining agreen1ents:
Distribution of private judges lo the preceding section, it was shown that the equiUbrium distribution of judges corresponds to the equilibriun1 distribution of bargainjng agreernents, but this is a purely formal Another implication of my hypothesis is that a public judge will tend to dlvide the stakes in the s.ame way as the private judge whom the disputants would choose through 1nutuaJ consent if choice were allowed. Thus a public judge will tend to resolve the ptoblem of distribution by dividing the stakes according to the barg-4ining strength of the parties. In ~freet, this is what a judge does when he attempts to induce disputants to settle rather than going to trial. An in1plication of this prediction is that a shift towards harder bargaining by one class of disputants will tend to induce a con1plcn1cntary shift in the distribution or j udicial opinion.
These predictions are based upon the argun1ent that a public judge who cultivates prestige a.mong litigants and lawyers will behave much like a pri,·ate judge. 1-lowcvcr, there are differences between the income-maximizing private judge artd the prestige~,naxirnizing public judge. Specifically, the public j udge may gi\le some weight to his prestige with nonlitigants, whereas the income-n1ax.in1izing private judge will give no weight to nonlitigants. For c.(ample, a public judge ,nay be concerned with his prest.ige among acadentic lawyers who read judicial opinions but do not represent clients. As a consequence, a public j udge may give some weight to third parties in situations where a private j udge would not.
Drawing the I.inc between private and public judging
The creation or a private alternative to public j udges in states like Califom ia has elicited comment in the press. l 7 The proponents argue that taxpayers are relieved from bearing the portion of trial costs uncovered by user fees, and litigants face reduced congestion in public courts. The critics argue that two qualities of justice. are supplied, the higher quality bejng enjoyed by those who can pay for it. My theory points to a different set of considerations. nle inverSC of this proposition is that private judges should be encouraged to decide cases whose effects are concentrated upon the litigants. In these disputes, the private judges have a direct financial interest in achieving a pairwise Pareto~fficienc resolution of the dispute, whereas the motivation of public jt1dgcs to do so is weaker.
Conclusion
Private judges who maximize demand for their $Crvices from disputants, each or whom has the power to veto c;hoice of a judge, will make dccis:ions which are pairwise Pareto e fficient and Split the c;ooperative surplus according to how hard the disputants barga.in. Public judges who seek prestige among those who know them best, namely litigants, will behave in much the same way as private judges. However, public judges pay a smaller price for not attending to the concerns of their immediate Litigants.
Private judges should probably be prevented from hearing cases whose effects arc diffuse, but in truly private disputes, where the effects do not extend beyond the Htigants, an expanded role for private judges would increase the efficiency of decisions and increase their acceptability to disputants. There is a broad range of policies which could encourage strictly private disputes to be decided by private judges. The supply of public judges could be increased by encouraging early retire,nent of public judges or by allowing public j udges u11tested empiricaUy. 21 t. 
